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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
QUI TAM ACTIONS UNDER THE 1899 REFUSE ACT:
POSSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL LEGAL ACTION TO
PREVENT WATER POLLUTION
"A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure."'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the decade of the 1960's a host of environmental problems were
brought to the attention of the American public, including overpopulation,
poisoning from pesticides, air pollution, and water pollution.2 As a result,
concerned individuals joined to form conservation dubs and other groups
in an attempt to find methods of combating the various problems.3
One of the methods proposed in the water pollution area arose from
certain provisions in an 1899 statute which has now come to be known as
the 1899 Refuse Act.4 Briefly stated, the Act prohibits the discharge of any
refuse matter into navigable water without first obtaining a permit from
the Corps of Engineers. Employees of the Corps are authorized to arrest
violators and request prosecution by United States attorneys, which can
result in the imposition of a fine and/or imprisonment. The statute also
provides that one-half of the fine assessed shall go to the informant upon
conviction. The fine that can be assessed ranges from a minimum of $500
to a maximum of $2500. Moreover, authority exists for the proposition that
each separate discharge (e.g., on two separate days) can be regarded as a
separate violation, and therefore punishable.
At first blush, this statute appeared to be a windfall for the environ-
mentalist, who would be able to take action to prevent pollution by pro-
viding the information necessary to file a complaint against the polluter,
and, upon conviction, be rewarded (sometimes quite substantially) for his
efforts. There were some resulting convictions under the Act, but not nearly
enough to satisfy some environmentalists, who felt that the Corps of
Engineers was not fulfilling its duties under the Act and that the United
States attorneys were failing "to vigorously prosecute all offenders . . .
whenever requested.. ."5 as the Act commands.0
1. Quote from Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
336, 342 (1931).
2. See, e.g., R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION
BOMB (1968).
3. E.g., Zero Population Growth, Natural Resources Defense Council, Friends
of the Earth; one need only look at the names of the plaintiffs in recent environ-
mental litigation to discover that the list is practically endless. Cf. Murphy, En-
vironmental Law: New Legal Concepts in the Anti-Pollution Fight, 36 Mo. L.
REv. 78 (1971).
4. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1964).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Tom, Jan. 25, 1971, at 43 for an example of a refusal by the
Justice Department to approve criminal action against a polluter (General Motors
in this case) under the Refuse Act. The over-zealous assistant prosecutor who sought
to bring the charges was subsequently dismissed from office. See also Polikoff, The
Interlake Affair, THE WASH. MoNTnHLY, Mar., 1971, at 7.
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However, in March of 1970, the House of Representatives Committee
on Government Operations issued a report 7 which referred to the possibility
of using a qui tam action to implement the provisions of the 1899 Refuse
Act. The report announced that a suit could be maintained by the informer
in the name of the United States in order to collect his moiety of the pen-
alty.8 That report generated tremendous interest among both members of
Congress and private citizens.9 The Conservation and Natural Resources
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, in re-
sponse to inquires from members of Congress, prepared a memorandum dis-
cussing more fully the applicability of these qui tam actions to the Refuse
Act,' 0 and concluded that the right exists to bring such actions."1
Meanwhile, the theory was being tested in the courts. At least four
cases have been decided, all holding that there is no right to bring the qui
tam action. It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the scope of the
Refuse Act (Part II), to give a brief history of the qui tam action (Part III),
and to examine the propriety of allowing qui tam actions under the pro-
visions of the Refuse Act (Part IV).
II. SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1899 REFUSE ACr
A. Section 407 Defined
1. Jurisdiction
Section 407 of title 33 United States Code provides in part:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit.., from
or out of any ship.., or from the shore, ... any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into
such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to deposit . . .
material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable
water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable
water . . . whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or ob-
structed: Provided ... That the Secretary of the Army, whenever
in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and naviga-
tion will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any
material above mentioned in navigable waters .... 12
Note that the Act applies to both navigable waters and their tributaries,
which may mean that practically all of the rivers and streams in the United
7. H.R. REP. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
8. Id. at 17.
9. Letter from Representative Henry S. Reuss to Representative Chet Holi-
field, Aug. 13, 1970.
10. STAFF OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL REsouRCES SuBcoMm. OF THE HousE
CoNiO.L ON GOVT. OPRATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., Qui Tam ACTIONS AND r
1899 REFUSE ACt: CmizEN LAWSurrs AGAINST POLLUTRS OF T NATION'S WATER-
WAYS (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as "Committee Print"].
11. Id. at 4.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
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States are covered. The scope of jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers to
regulate obstructions to and diversions from navigable waters of the United
States has been defined in many cases. 13 The United States Supreme Court
decided over a century ago that rivers are navigable if they "are used or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the cus-
tomary modes of trade and travel on water."'14 Since the river need only be
susceptible of being used for commerce, the test may vary slightly with the
region involved, depending on the nature of the commercial traffic in that
particular area. The basic test has received a liberal interpretation; the
courts have looked to the early usage of a river in making the determination
(e.g., to see if fur traders floated canoes in the river for "commercial" pur-
poses),i 5 Also, they have held that a river is navigable if improvements, such
as dams, make it commercially usable.' 6 In addition, federal jurisdiction has
been extended to tributaries of navigable waters of the United States
wherever obstructions to or diversions from those tributaries affect the
navigable capacity of the navigable waters.17 If the same scope of jurisdiction
is applied to water pollution regulation by the Corps as has been recognized
for other forms of regulation of navigable waters, the Act has sufficient
jurisdictional scope to be a very effective anti-pollution tool.
2. What Is "Refuse?"
The term "refuse" as used in the Act has been accorded a very liberal
interpretation; it encompasses almost any deposit imaginable. As early as
1936 in La Merced (United States v. Alaska Southern Packing Co.),1 8 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the phrase "whereby navigation
shall or may be impeded" did not limit the term "refuse matter," but re-
ferred only to the deposit of materials on the bank of the river. The court
went on to find that oil was included within the meaning of the term "ref-
use." Three years later the same court held that lack of intent on the part
of a ship's officers did not prevent liability under the Act, provided there
was in fact a discharge.' 9
13. The authority of the Corps of Engineers to regulate obstructions to and
diversions from navigable waters of the United States is derived from the Rivers
& Harbors Act of 1899, of which the so-called 1899 Refuse Act is a part. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-09 (1964).
14. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (emphasis added). This case
involved interpretation of a federal statute imposing a penalty for failure to
obtain a boat registration license on a "navigable water."
15. Cf. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
16. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874). For a detailed discussion
of the different definitions of navigability and the purposes for which they are
used, see Johnson, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1967).
17. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
18. 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936). See also United States v. Ballard Oil Co.,
195 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1952), where the second circuit also applied this construc-
tion and upheld a conviction for allowing oil to be discharged into a navigable
water. Id. at 371.
19. The President Coolidge (Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States), 101 F.2d 638(9th Cir. 1939), where there was testimony that garbage was thrown from a steam-
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In United States v. Republic Steel Corp,20 the United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded that "in-
dustrial solids" which were in suspension in liquid wastes were encompassed
by the phrase "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state," and were prohibited discharges within the meaning of the statute.
The Court also stated:
The fact that discharges from streets and sewers may contain some
articles in suspension that settle out and potentially impair navi-
gability is no reason for us to enlarge the group to include these
industrial discharges.... We read the 1899 Act charitably in light
of the purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of
Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York... that "A river
is more than an amenity, it is a treasure," forbids a narrow,
cramped reading either of [section 407] or of [section 408].21
In 1966, the Supreme Court was again called upon to interpret pro-
visions of the Refuse Act. In United States v. Standard Oil Co.,22 the de-
fendant oil company was indicted under the Refuse Act for discharging 100-
octane aviation oil into the St. John's River. The district court dismissed the
indictment on the ground that commercially valuable material such as this
gasoline was not included in the term "refuse" under the Act. That ruling
was reversed by the Supreme Court. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote:
This case comes to us at a time in the Nation's history when there
is greater concern than ever over pollution-one of the main
threats to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis
that we face in this respect would not, of course, warrant us in
manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretch-
ing statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange condi-
tions. But whatever may be said for the rule of strict construction,
it cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent, and
legislative history. We cannot construe [section 407] in a vacuum.
Nor can we read it as Baron Parke2 3 would read a pleading.2 4
3. Indirect Discharges
The earlier cases had held that the requirement that navigation be
impeded or obstructed applied only to the second of the two separate of-
ship even though the ship's employees were under orders not to throw such
garbage into the water. The defendant's argument that a "falling" of garbage
did not amount to a "throwing" as required by the Act was also rejected. Id. at
639. See also United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. IlL.
1969), holding that scienter is not required because depositing refuse in navigable
waters is a malum prohibitum offense. Id. at 915.
20. 562 U.S. 482 (1960).
21. Id. at 490-91. The Court also held that injunctive relief was available
under the Refuse Act. See pt. II, § B of this Comment.
22. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
23. "A man whose 'fault was an almost superstitious reverence for the dark
technicalities of special peading.' XV Dictionary of National Biography, 226 (Ste-
phen and Lee ed. 1937-1938)." Id. at 226 n.2.
24. Id. at 225-26.
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Lenses created by section 407.25 So in 1967 when Esso Standard Oil Company
was indicted for violating the statute by allowing oil to flow over an area
of land and into the ocean, the company contended that the first offense
required a direct discharge since the second offense covered indirect dis-
charges. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to accept that argu-
ment since it would require a "narrow, cramped reading" of the statute
which is forbidden by Republic Steel.26 The statute was once again given a
liberal construction.
B. Remedies Available and Section 411
1. Injunctive Relief
Just as section 407 has been given the benefit of a liberal interpretation,
so have the remedies available under the Act been defined liberally, at
least until quite recently. In Republic Steel, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal district court order enjoining the defendant from continuing to dis-
charge industrial solid wastes into a river and ordering the defendant to
remove the deposits that had already accumulated. In Wyandotte Trans-
portation Co. v. United States,27 the Government was awarded its costs of
removing a negligently sunken barge which the owner had refused to re-
move. The defendant contended that the section 411 remedies were ex-
clusive, but this argument was rejected. The Court stated: "[O]ur reading
of the [Refuse] Act does not lead us to the conclusion that Congress must
have intended the statutory remedies and procedures to be exclusive of all
others." 28
2. Criminal Penalties
The criminal penalty provided for in section 411 may appear to have
little deterrent effect because of the relatively small amount of the maximum
penalty. The section provides:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provi-
sions of sections 407, 408, and 409 of this tide shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment
(in the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor
more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the person
or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.2 9
25. United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); La Merced
(United States v. Alaska S. Packing Co.), 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936). See note 19
supra.
26. United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1967).
27. 389 U.S. 191 (1967). The barge, which contained 2,200,000 pounds of
liquid chlorine, sank in the Mississippi River. It was feared that if any of the
chlorine escaped, it would be in the form of lethal chlorine gas, which could
result in a number of casualties. The recovery operation cost the Government more
than $3,000,000. Id. at 194-95.
28. Id. at 200.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
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Although $2500 may seem like a slap on the wrist to many large pollut-
ers, the holding of the court in United States v. S. S. Mormacsaga3 O indicates
that more substantial fines are possible. There, three separate discharges
from a ship, over a period of three and one-half hours, were held to be three
separate offenses, with each one being punishable by assessment of a fine
within the statutory limits.31 So the possibility of substantial cumulative
fines does exist.
3. Relation to Other Federal Water Pollution Legislation
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 197032 specifically states that
it is not to be construed as impairing the provisions of the Refuse Act.33
It should be dear that compliance with state or federal water quality
standards will not prevent the possibility of prosecution under the Refuse
Act.8 4 The Refuse Act is potentially a much more powerful weapon in the
war against water pollution than the recent federal legislation because of
the various limitations contained in that legislation.3 5 For example, under
those statutes, the pollution must affect interstate waters, and abatement
proceedings can be initiated only with the governor's consent unless the
pollution is "endangering the health or welfare of persons in a State other
than that in which the discharge or discharges ... originate."3 6 Judicial
enforcement proceedings under the Refuse Act may be begun without any
period of delay such as that required by the Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970.37
30. 204 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
31. The defendant was fined the minimum amount of $500 for each of the
violations. However, in this case the type of refuse varied with each discharge. Id.
at 702. It is possible that an industrial polluter could characterize a continuing
discharge as a "course of conduct" which would be punishable only as one offense.
Cf. United States v. Alaimo, 297 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1961).
32. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1152 et seq. (1970).
33. Id. § 1174.
34. United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
35. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1160 (1970).
36. Id. § 1160 (g) (1).
37. The Act provides that on the request of the Governor of a state or on
the Secretary of the Interior's own initiative if interstate pollution is involved
(interstate pollution is pollution that originates in one state and endangers the
health or welfare of a person in another state), a minimum three-week notice is
given to all state and federal agencies involved and a conference is called. All
the agencies are allowed to present their views at the conference. The Secretary
then prepares a summary of the conference in which he includes any recommenda-
tions concerning abatement of the pollution. A minimum six-month period is
allowed before any further action may be taken. If the recommendations are
not complied with, the Secretary can call a public hearing before a group (called
the Hearing Board) composed of five persons appointed by the Secretary. The
findings and recommendations of the Hearing Board are sent to the Secretary
and he forwards any recommendations to the violators who are given six more
months to take action. Only after the expiration of that time may the Secretary
request the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the United States. In the
case of intra-state pollution the Secretary may make the request only with the
consent of the Governor of the state where the pollution is occurring. Id. § 1160.
1971]
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C. Enforcement of the Act
1. Statutory Provisions: Section 413
Section 413 of title 33 United States Code puts the duty of enforcing
the provisions of the Refuse Act on the United States attorneys. It provides
in part:
The Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings
necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 401, 403, 404, 406,
407, 408, 409, 411, 549, 686, and 687 of this title; and it shall be the
duty of United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders
against the same whenever requested [by certain officials]. 88
It has been pointed out that there was "little enforcement activity under
this law for many years,"39 but in February, 1970, "the Justice Department
reported over 110 cases pending, while another 99 were dosed out in fiscal
1969."40
2. The "Deference" Policy
Early in 1970 the executive branch of the federal government decided
that the Justice Department should "defer" in these pollution matters to
the Federal Water Quality Administration Agency.41 The Government in-
dicated that it did not intend to enforce the Refuse Act against many
polluters.4 2 On June 2, 1970, Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa wrote:
In our opinion, it would not be in the genuine interest of the
government to bring an action under the Refuse Act to secure a
criminal sanction against a company which admittedly is discharg-
ing refuse into the navigable waters of the United States, but which
pursuant to a program being conducted by the Federal Water
Quality Administration, is spending significant amounts to secure
the abatement of that pollution.4 3
That position was adopted by the Justice Department in a directive to
all United States attorneys entitled "Guidelines for Litigation Under the
38. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964) (emphasis added).
39. Rogers, Environmental Quality Control, 3 NAT. RErs. LAwYER 716, 723(1970).
40. Id.
41. Polikoff, supra note 6, at 10.
42. Committee Print at 10.
43. Id. (emphasis added). For a very interesting factual account of an incident
involving one of these companies that was spending a "significant amount" to
secure the abatement of water pollution, see Polikoff, supra note 6, at 7. The author
reports that the defendant steel company was convicted under the Refuse Act
after complaints of the violation had been repeatedly filed with the Coast Guard
by an employee of the company. The employee was awarded one-half of the
500 fine imposed under § 407. However, the violations continued after the con-
viction and the employee again filed complaints with the Coast Guard. Un-
fortunately, though, this was after the so-called "deference" policy had been
instituted and no action from the Justice Department was forthcoming. So the
pollution continued and the employee was fired. On last account (Nov. 19, 1970)
the employee had filed a qui tam action against the company on the theory that
he had the right to enforce the Act to obtain his half of the fine. Id. at 8-16. See
the discussion of qui tam actions in pt. IV of this Comment.
[Vol. 36
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Refuse Act" in July, 1970.44 One writer had these comments in regard to
those "guidelines:"
These guidelines indicate a lamentable policy in 1970, to permit
local United States Attorneys, acting on their own initiative to en-
force the Refuse Act only against "the occasional or recalcitrant
polluter" but not against "manufacturing plants which contin-
uously discharge refuse into the navigable waters of the United
States." This is done allegedly to cooperate with the Federal Water
Quality Administration, but no effective guidelines are set forth
for such cooperation and the well known conservationists take
great exception to the Department of Justice disarmin& its local
United States Attorneys in this manner in the fight against water
pollution.45
President Nixon's statement on December 23, 1970 concerning a "more
activist utilization of the Refuse Act" 46 would seem to be in conflict with
the guidelines, but apparently the guidelines are still in effect. 47
However, the fears of the conservationists may not be justified. Apparently
under the cooperative guidelines, the Justice Department in 1971 filed a
number of suits seeking abatement of water pollution under the Refuse
Act. These suits have concentrated on large industrial and municipal waste
dischargers.48
3. The New Corps Permit System 49
Beginning on July 1, 1971, every existing waste discharge, except munic-
ipal liquid sewage, entering a water over which the Corps of Engineers
asserts jurisdiction must be authorized by a Corps permit. By that date all
waste dischargers must have applied for a permit. At the present time, all
industrial waste dischargers0 and all agricultural waste dischargers generat-
ing animal wastes from feedlots containing 1,000 animal units or more51
44. Committee Print at 10.
45. Harris, Environmental Law: A Private or Govermental Responsibility?, 3
NAT. Rrs. LAW'YER 710, 714 (1970).
46. Polikoff, supra note 6, at 14.
47. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of the Army, Jan. 12, 1971, 36
Fed. Reg. 8074 (1971).
48. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1970, at 14, col. 7; Feb. 15, 1971, at 35, col 8;
Feb. 20, 1971, at 28, col 2; April 7, 1971, at 86, col. 2; June 15, 1971, at 10, col. 4.
The suits have concentrated on the Birmingham, Chicago, Cleveland, and Pitts-
burg areas.
49. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.131, 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (1971). See generally Cum. &
ENG. NEws, May 3, 1971, at 21-22. These authorities were the source for the textual
discussion which follows, except where indicated.
50. Except industries discharging into municipal or public sewer systems or
treatment plants and into combined industrial waste treatment systems which
themselves have applied for permits.
51. Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, before House Committee on Agriculture, May 25, 1971. One
thousand animal units is the equivalent of 1,000 beef cattle, 700 dairy cattle,
4,500 butcher hogs, 12,000 sheep, 35,000 feeder pigs, 55,000 turkeys, 180,000 laying
hens, or 250,000 broilers. It is estimated that there are approximately 5,400 such
feedlots in the United States. Id.
1971]
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must apply for a permit. The application on form 4845-1 requires detailed
disclosure of the constituent parts, flow pattern and location of each dis-
charge. Application is made at the Corps district offices at Tulsa, Memphis,
Rock Island, St. Louis, Litle Rock, Omaha and Kansas City respectively
for the various watersheds in Missouri. Application for new discharges must
be filed 120 days before they are begun. Application constitutes sufficient
compliance with the Act pending processing of the application.
The Corps has begun processing the applications of the largest waste
dischargers first, primarily to obtain the maximum impact from its permit
program at an early date. The Corps will issue a permit to a waste discharger
only if the state and/or interstate water pollution control agency certifies
that the waste discharger has complied with state stream standards and if
the federal Environmental Protection Agency certifies that the discharge
complies with its effluent guidelines. Other federal agencies will also review
applications for the impact of discharges on both wildlife and environmental
values other than water quality. The Corps itself will specify the degree of
treatment which is required for each discharge before a permit will issue.
Pending construction of the required treatment facilities the Corps will
issue interim permits. Waste discharge facilities existing on April 3, 1970,
will have to get state certification of compliance by April 3, 1973. Even
after a permit is issued, the waste discharger must comply with any change
in water quality standards made subsequent to the date of the permit.
Permits will be subject to suspension, modification or revocation if the
authorized discharge is found to contain materials hazardous to public
health or safety.
As part of the procedure for processing applications for Corps permits,
the district offices will issue public notices identifying the nature and loca-
tion of the discharge, and notify interested federal and state agencies and
known interested parties. If expressions of public interest warrant, public
hearings on applications will be held.
The procedure of the Corps of Engineers is designed to foster coopera-
tion between itself, the state agencies, and the Environmental Protection
Agency and to compel disclosure of the nature and extent of the major
industrial waste discharges in the United States. If adequately implemented,
the Corps permit system offers a forceful tool for cleaning the nation's water-
ways. It bears watching to see if it realizes its great potential.
III. Qui Tam AcrIONS
A. Qui Tam Defined
"A qui tam action is a civil action brought by a citizen to collect a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, a share (usually one-half) of which he is allowed to
keep for himself by the statute imposing the fine or penalty." 52 The citizen
52. Committee Print at 1. BouvER's LAW DICTIONARY 2784 (3d ed. 1914)
defines qui tam as:
An action under a statute which imposes a penalty for the doing or not
doing an act, and gives that penalty in part to whomsoever will sue for
the same, and the other part to the commonwealth, . . .or other insti-
[Vol. 36
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must have sufficient information to convict53 the violator of the statute
and the statute must provide that the informer is entitled to share in the
penalty. Ordinarily this information would be turned over to the law en-
forcement officials who would take care of the prosecution. Where, for one
reason or another, that solution is not satisfactory, the citizen may bring a
civil action to recover his share of the penalty.
B. History and Purpose of the Qui Tam Action
Qui tam actions were necessary during earlier periods in English history
since police forces and prosecutors were often inadequate or non-existent.5 4
However, it has been noted that they also serve another purpose: to insure
that the law is complied with, when for one reason or another, the authori-
ties are not enforcing it.55
Qui tam actions have also been used as a means of enforcing both state
and federal statutes56 in the United States.57 Most of the qui tam actions
tution, and makes it recoverable by action. The plaintiff describes himself
as suing as well for the commonwealth, for example, as for himself.
Tim DICTIONARY OF ENGLiSH LAw 1463 (E. Jowitt ed. 1959) defines it as:(A) popular action (i.e., one which anyone may bring) on a penal statute(q.v.) which was partly at the suit of the Crown and partly at that of an
informer: so called from the words qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro
se ipso, sequitur (who as well for our lord the king, as for himself, sues).
BLAcK's LAW DIarIoNARY 1414 (4th ed. 1968) states:
An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides
that the same shall be recoverable in a dvil action, part of the penalty
to go to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to
the state or some other institution, is called a "qui tam action"; because
the plaintiff states that he sues as well for the state as for himself.
Note the slight differences in the three definitions as to whether or not the statute
must provide that the action may be maintained without express provision. Black's
definition includes the Words "and provides that the same shall be recoverable in
a civil action." The Dictionary of English Law makes no reference to any such
requirement, while the Bouvier definition is somewhat ambiguous: "and makes
it recoverable by action."
53. The burden of proof in these cases, however, is the burden of proof
required to prevail in a civil case (i.e., a preponderance of the evidence) rather
than the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Regan,
232 U.S. 37 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); United States
v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
54. Committee Print at 2.
55. Id. at 2 n.2. See 171 PA.L. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1052 (1951), where Viscount
Simon stated:
If we lived in an age when the authorities could be suspected of refusing,
out of favouritism or fear, to prosecute a particular kind of person, it
might be a very useful thing to have [the common informer system](emphasis added).
56. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 962 (1964) (arming vessels against friendly powers);
21 U.S.C. § 183 (1964) (control of narcotics). See also Chicago & A.R.R. v.
Howard, 38 Ill. 414 (1865); 25 U.S.C. §§ 193, 201 (1964) (protection of Indians);
31 U.S.C. §§ 155, 163 (1964) (breaches of duty of United States Treasurer).
57. In Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had
no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute,
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this
country ever since the foundation of our Government.
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have arisen under statutes which expressly provide for the maintenance
of the action, i.e., statutes which state that the action may be instituted
by any person on behalf of the Government. Where there is a statutory pro-
vision for part of the penalty to be paid to the informer and no express
provision allowing the informer to institute the suit himself (which is
the case with the Refuse Act), it is not clear from the case law whether the
qui tam action may be brought.
IV. PROPRIETY OF Qui Tam AcrxoNs UNDER THE 1899 REFUSE Acr
A. Related Cases Under Other Acts
The memorandum prepared by the Conservation and Natural Re-
sources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations 5s
which surveys the cases wherein the problem of whether or not express statu-
tory authorization is necessary for a qui tam action to be maintained (i.e.,
when the statute neither specifically allows nor prohibits the qui tam action)
has been discussed. There are a few state cases which hold that the qui tam
action does not lie unless expressly authorized,59 and there are at least two
federal court cases from which the same inference can be drawn. 60
On the other hand, there is authority for the proposition that the
qui tam action does lie where the statute is silent on the matter. In 1943,
in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,(;' Mr. Justice Black noted:
Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifi-
cally either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action
are construed to authorize him to sue, Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch
336.602
In the Adams case, which Mr. Justice Black cited as authority, the question
of express authorization did not arise. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall
assumed that the right existed and held that the statute of limitations ap-
plied to the qui tam action as well as to the criminal prosecution. 63 More-
58. See pt. I of this Comment.
59. O'Kelly v. Athens Mfg. Co., 936 Ga. 51 (1876) (statute requiring com-
panies to publicly list the names of shareholders). See also Wheeler v. Goulding,
79 Mass. 539 (1859); Smith v. Look, 108 Mass. 139 (1871) (statute relating to
Massachusetts' fish and game laws); Omaha & R.V. Ry. v. Hale, 45 Neb. 418
(1895) (statute requiring the railroad company to ring a bell while trains cross
the tracks at a road crossing).
60. Williams v. Wells Fargo Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910); Rosenberg v.
Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901). Williams dealt with a violation
of the postal laws and Rosenberg with a violation of the Alien Contract Labor Law.
61. 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (the fact that there was a previous criminal con-
viction did not preclude a recovery under the qui tam statute).
62. Id. at 541 n.4. In the same opinion, the Supreme Court refused to accept
the third circuit's view that the statute should be construed strictly because qui tam
actions "have always been regarded with disfavor." The Court stated:
We cannot accept either the interpretive approach or the actual decision
of the Court below. Qui Tam suits have been frequently permitted by
legislative action and have not been without defense by the courts. Id.
at 540-41.
63. Adams, qui tam, v. Woods, 2 U.S. 492, 2 Cranch 336 (1805).
[Vol. 36
11
Drennan: Drennan: Qui Tam Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
COMMENTS
over, the wording of the statute there in question differs from that of the
Refuse Act;0 4 this illustrates one of the problems involved, since the same
thing can be said of all of the other statutes where this question has arisen.
However, one statute which has substantially the same language as that
in the Refuse Act has received favorable judicial interpretation. This is
the Harter Act.65 In United States ex rel. Pressprich Son Co. v. James W.
Elwell & Co.06 Judge Learned Hand stated:
We think that the District Court had no jurisdiction in admiralty
over the collection of a penalty by proceedings in personam ....
Nevertheless, we have no doubt that the fine might be collected by
qui tam action in the District Court [citations, omitted] and that
the jurisdiction of the District Court over the subject-matter was,
therefore, complete.6 7
B. Other Considerations
Since it is unclear from the case law whether a qui tam action may
properly be maintained under the Refuse Act and it is impossible to glean
congressional intent from the wording of the statute, it seems that public
policy considerations should be taken into account in making the determi-
nation. There is little doubt that this country's water bodies are threatened
with destruction. 68 Action must be taken before more of these watercourses
and waterways get to the point where Lake Erie is presently.6 9 While pro-
grams are being initiated at both the state and federal levels, these programs
are often slow in being put into operation and even slower in obtaining
concrete results. 70 Further, the multiplication of state and federal agencies,
64. The statute in question there provided that violators "shall severally
forfeit and pay the sum of two thousand dollars, one moiety thereof to the use
of the United States, and the other moiety thereof to the use of him or her who
shall sue for and prosecute the same" (emphasis added). Act of Mar. 22, 1794,
ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 349. This statute seems to lend itself to a construction allow-
ing the qui tam action more easily than the Refuse Act. See the language of § 407,
quoted in the text accompanying note 12 supra.
65. 46 U.S.C. § 194 (1964), which provides:
For a violation of [the Harter Act] the [violator] shall be liable to a fine
not exceeding $2000 .... One half of such penalty shall go to the party
injured by such violation and the remainder to the Government of the
United States.
66. 250 F. 939 (2d Cir. 1918).
67. Id. at 941 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857
(D. Mont. 1898), where the court stated:
Any words of a statute which show that a part of the penalty named
therein shall be for the use of an informer will entitle him to maintain
an action therefor if he complies with the conditions of the statute.
Id. at 861.
68. See H.R. RP. No. 917, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
69. The only dispute concerning the environmental quality of Lake Erie
seems to be whether the lake is "dying" or is already "dead." See, e.g., Schrag, Life
on. a Dying Lake, SATURDAY Rxv., Sept. 20, 1969, at 19. Lake Erie serves as a
prime example of what can happen when nothing is done to prevent water pollu-
tion.
70. See note 87 supra for an example of the cumbersome nature of some of
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particularly in an area where there is no dearly defined authority,71 leaves
open the possibility that those concrete results may never be obtained. Al-
lowing the qui tam action to be brought by the individual could well result
in forcing polluters to comply with the law and refrain from discharging
harmful materials into our nation's waterways, regardless of whether they
are spending "significant amounts" on pollution abatement in another
manner. It could also mean that results could be obtained more quickly,
since the bureaucrats could be by-passed and suit could be filed im-
mediately.7 2 Both of those results would, in this writer's opinion, be de-
sirable, and should be taken into account by any court passing on the issue.
C. The Recent Cases
At least four qui tam actions have recently been brought in district
courts under section 407 of the Refuse Act.73 All of those cases held that a
qui tam action could not be brought under the provisions of the Refuse
Act. In Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc.,74 the court felt that there was insuf-
ficient authority for the proposition that a qui tam action may be main-
tained in the absence of express statutory authorization. The court quoted
from one of the other three cases, Bass Anglers Sportsman's Society of
America v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.,75 to rebut the statement
made by Mr. Justice Black in Markus:7 6
Justice Black's dictum would appear to state the law too broadly.
The qui tam action depends entirely upon statutory authorization,
as it has never found its way into the common law. The action
arises only upon a statutory grant. The fact that someone is entitled
by statute to share in some penalty or forfeiture does not necessarily
also give such person the right to bring an original action to recover
such penalty or forfeiture. There must be statutory authority either
express or implied, for the informer to bring the qui tam action.
When the statute is silent as to whether the qui tam action is auth-
orized, and nothing can be gleaned concerning congressional intent
71. The enforcement of the provisions of the Refuse Act provide an apt
illustration of this. The typical enforcement procedure goes something like this:
The violation is reported to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard checks on the
violation and then refers it to the Corps of Engineers. The Corps makes a further
check, then notifies the local United States attorney's office where the informa-
tion must be gone over once again before action is taken. That "action," as of
late, has been to defer to yet another agency, the Federal Water Quality Admin-
istration. See Polikoff, The Interlake Affair, TnE WASH. MoNTHLY, Mar., 1971, at 7.
72. It is also unclear whether the informant must request the Government
to file suit as a prerequisite to his own filing. Cf. United States v. Griswold, 26 F.
Cas. 42 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore. 1877). As long as the "deference" policy continues
the requirement, if imposed, might be of no real consequence, since in most cases
there would probably be an almost automatic refusal by the United States attorney.
73. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (D. Ala. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of America v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-Ameri-
can, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
74. 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
75. 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
76. See pt. IV, § A of this Comment.
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from the circumstances surrounding the passage of the statute then
perhaps Justice Black's construction in favor of the qui tam action
may be justified in many instances. But Black's construction ob-
viously is inappropriate whenever the statute's language, by
necessary implication, precludes such a conclusion.77
The court's reasoning is not completely dear. Since the Refuse Act
is "silent as to whether the qui tam action is authorized," then it would seem
that Justice Black's construction in favor of qui tam actions would be
justified in this instance. Instead the court found that since section 413
provides that the Justice Department "shall conduct the legal proceedings
necessary to enforce the provisions of section ... 407," there is no room
to imply that any others may sue to enforce the statute. The court went on
to quote from another of the recent cases, Bass Angler Sportsman Society
v. United States Steel Corp.78 : "[W]here some statutory language seems to
grant a private right of action, if the same or related statute dearly places
enforcement in the hands of governmental authorities the right of action
is exclusively vested in such governmental authority." 79 The court cited
Williams v. Wells Fargo Co.8O and Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works8l as
authority for that proposition. However, in each of those cases the statute
involved lent itself to the "exclusive" interpretation more easily than the
Refuse Act does. In Williams, the statute read: "[A]U1 suits arising under
the postal laws, shall be brought in the name of the United States,"82 and in
Rosenberg the statute provided: "[I]t shall be the duty of the district at-
torney .. . to prosecute every such suit at the expense of the United
States."83
Section 413 makes no reference to all legal proceedings nor to every
legal proceeding. It makes it the duty of the United States attorney to prose-
cute all offenders when requested, but it does not exclude other legal pro-
ceedings by providing that all legal proceedings are to be brought by the
United States attorney.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that those district courts which have refused to allow
the qui tam action to be maintained under the Refuse Act are in error.
It has been pointed out above that there is no controlling authority on the
issue. By failing to give substantial weight to the public policy arguments
in favor of allowing the action,8 4 the courts have rendered useless what
77. Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. Wis. 1971)(emphasis added).
78. 324 F. Supp. 412 (D. Ala. 1971).
79. 323 F. Supp. at 850.
80. 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910).
81. 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
82. Williams v. Wells Fargo Co., 177 F. 352, 354 (8th Cir. 1910) (emphasis
added).
83. Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1901) (em-
phasis added). See note 60 supra.
84. In Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of America v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971), the court, at the outset of the
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could be a very valuable tool in the prevention of water pollution in this
country. The impact of these decisions may be increased by the existence of
the "deference" policy of the Justice Department in enforcing the Refuse
Act. It has been noted that the qui tam action could be a very useful thing
"[i]f we lived in an age when the authorities could be suspected of refusing,
out of favouritism or fear, to prosecute a particular kind of person."3 5 It is
submitted that in regard to this particular matter, we do live in that imagi-
nary age referred to, presently.
Further, the results are in conflict with two significant trends of judicial
decisions, the first dealing with environmental problems in general, and
the second dealing with the Refuse Act itself. The courts have become in-
creasingly aware of environmental problems and in doing their part to in-
sure that the environment is protected. This is evidenced by recent decisions
expanding the concept of standing to sues and requiring agencies to con-
sider environmental effects in certain cases before taking a course of action.87
Secondly, the Refuse Act has been repeatedly given a liberal construction 8
and the Supreme Court has commanded that it should not be read "in a
vacuum."8 9 It appears that these courts are doing precisely what the Supreme
Court has forbidden: given the Refuse Act a "narrow, cramped reading." 90
If these rulings are upheld in the appellate courts, the private indi-
vidual concerned with insuring that the provisions of the Refuse Act are
complied with would apparently have only one alternative remaining. That
alternative would be to file a mandamus action against the district attorney
under the federal mandamus statute9' passed in 1962. Examination of the
particular problems involved if such a suit were filed is beyond the scope
of this comment,92 but it might be pointed out that at least one such action
has reportedly been filed,93 and in one of the recent qui tam actions dis-
opinion, noted the seriousness of the problem of "the gradual degradation of [the]
environment." Id. at 303. However, the court went on to find that the Refuse Act
is "solely criminal" and that "[n]othing in these statutes intimates that a civil
enforcement procedure is authonzed." Id. at 305.
85. See note 55 supra.
86. See e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189
(W.D. Tenn. 1970); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
87. Cases cited note 86 supra. See also Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
593 (D. Colo. 1969).
88. See pt. II of this Comment.
89. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 584 U.S. 224, 226 (1966).
90. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the
nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
92. The district attorney would presumably argue that any prosecution is a
"discretionary" act and therefore not within the scope of the Act since a writ of
mandamus can not compel an official to perform a discretionary act. R.E.D.M.
Corp. v. Lo Secco, 291 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 412 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1969). The plaintiff might contend that the word "shall" in the statute (§ 413)
leaves no room for discretion. The author does not feel competent to speculate
on the outcome of such a suit.
93. See Harris, supra note 45, at 714.
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cussed supra9H the court construed a request for injunctive relief to be a
request for a writ of mandamus under the federal mandamus statute and
denied the relief because it did not involve a "ministerial" act.95 Hopefully,
the appellate courts will see fit to reverse the stand that has been taken by
the district courts on the qui tam issue and such mandamus suits will not
be necessary.
CHARLEs N. DRENNAN
94. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (D. Ala. 1971).
95. Id. at 416.
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